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 Regina Polselli brought a diversity action in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania alleging, inter alia, bad faith on the part of the 
insurer, Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company (Nationwide), 
in its handling of her fire loss claim.  Following a bench trial, 
the district court concluded that Nationwide did act in bad faith 
and awarded Polselli $90,000 in punitive damages pursuant to 
Pennsylvania's bad faith statute, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8371 
(Supp. 1993).1  Nationwide filed a motion for reconsideration, 
which the district court denied.  Nationwide appeals.  We 
reverse.  
I.  
 On January 1, 1991, a fire occurred at the Polselli 
home causing considerable damage.  Regina's husband Rudolph was 
the sole titled owner of the premises and the sole named insured 
on a homeowner's insurance policy entered into with Nationwide. 
Under the policy, Nationwide had the responsibility to reimburse 
the insured for damage to the building (Building claim), its 
contents (Contents claim), along with additional living expenses 
(ALE claim).  Rudolph moved out of the Polselli home in April 
1988 and currently resides in Florida.  In May 1988 he filed a 
divorce action, described as bitter, which was still pending at 
the time of the fire.  When the fire happened, Regina, along with 
                                                           
1The insured lived in Pennsylvania where the damages to her 
property and the negotiations occurred.  The district court and 
the parties applied substantive Pennsylvania law, as do we.  
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her daughter, solely occupied the Polselli property.  The fire 
forced them to vacate the home.   
 Immediately upon being notified of the fire, Nationwide 
assigned Joseph DiDonato to handle the adjustment for it. 
DiDonato's supervisor instructed him to deal only with Rudolph. 
Regina retained Steven H. Smith as her public adjuster to prepare 
and adjust her claims.  In the aftermath of the fire, 
considerable confusion reigned among the parties as to their 
rights and responsibilities due to the title ownership of the 
premises, the pending divorce action between Regina and Rudolph, 
the mutual distrust and dislike between Regina and Rudolph and 
questions of Regina's insurable interest and right to possession 
of the property.   
 On January 3, 1991, Smith sent DiDonato a letter which 
set forth the basis for Regina's insurable interest and requested 
immediate funds to alleviate Regina's desperate living conditions 
and to satisfy Regina's claim.  On January 14, 1991, DiDonato 
replied that Nationwide was still in the process of 
investigating.  DiDonato also wrote to Rudolph and his attorney 
asking for information necessary for the investigation, and for 
permission to enter the premises.  In the meantime, Harry P. 
Begier, Jr., Regina's attorney, wrote three letters to Nationwide 
in January 1991, requesting that it proceed to process and adjust 
Regina's ALE claim.   
 On January 28, 1991, Smith filed a proof of loss of 
$120,642 for the Building claim, $64,385 for the Contents claim, 
and $960 per month to rent an unfurnished home, to which Regina 
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later admitted that she had no intention of moving, for the ALE 
claim.  Smith later revised the ALE claim to $1,666.66 monthly, 
based on the rental of an apartment on the New Jersey shore. 
Rudolph also asserted claims for the building and a portion of 
the contents.  In response to the letters sent and claims made in 
behalf of Regina, DiDonato reiterated Nationwide's position that 
no funds would be forthcoming until it completed inspecting, 
investigating and evaluating the loss.  After entering the 
Polselli home on February 7, 1991, and discovering evidence 
suggesting that the fire had been deliberately set, DiDonato, on 
February 11, requested a cause and origin investigation by an 
outside investigator.  Although the Fire Marshall had previously 
opined, on the day of the fire, that the fire was accidental, 
Nationwide's policy is not to talk to the Fire Marshal until its 
own investigation is complete.  
  Begier claims that on February 8, John R. Riddell, 
Nationwide's attorney, orally agreed to adjust Regina's ALE claim 
without further delay.  Begier telecopied a letter to Riddell 
confirming this information.  On February 13, Nationwide engaged 
INS Investigations Bureau, Inc. to investigate the cause and 
origin of the fire.  After making a number of additional requests 
for an advance payment on her ALE and Contents claims, Regina 
filed suit against Nationwide on March 4, 61 days after the fire, 
alleging, among other things, bad faith in Nationwide's handling 
of her claims.  Two days after the suit was filed, Begier wrote 
to Riddell to confirm their agreement that Riddell would meet 
with Smith on the following week to review Regina's Contents 
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claim, and that the ALE claim would be adjusted promptly so that 
it could be paid the following week. 
 On March 12, 1991, Nationwide received a written report 
that determined that the origin of the fire was accidental. 
DiDonato testified that the ALE claim could have been paid 
immediately upon receipt of the fire report.  He did not know why 
an advance payment was not made until July 17, 1991.  He 
testified, however, that once Regina filed suit, he transferred 
the file to the insurer's attorney and no longer had control over 
the adjustment of the claim.  Begier notified Riddell on March 
12, that the deposition of Regina scheduled for March 15, 1991 
would be cancelled if an advance payment on the ALE claim was not 
made as promised.  No payment was made and the deposition was 
cancelled.   
 On April 16, after a month of inaction, Riddell advised 
Begier of Nationwide's offer to settle the ALE claim for $11,130. 
On the same day, Riddell also advised Begier that Rudolph had 
made an oral claim on the contents of the home, and that 
Nationwide intended to interplead the Contents claim.  In light 
of Begier's contention that Nationwide reneged on an earlier 
promise to make a payment on the ALE claim, he requested 
confirmation in writing of Nationwide's offer.  On May 9, Begier, 
not having received confirmation from Nationwide, requested that 
settlement of Regina's claim be expedited and that an advance 
payment be made.  Riddell expressed surprise at Begier's letter, 
inasmuch as Nationwide was awaiting a reply on its $11,130 offer 
made to Begier for the ALE claim.   
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 On March 16, Begier rejected the offer and notified 
Nationwide that due to a judgment lien in excess of $600,000 on 
the property, Regina was no longer interested in rebuilding the 
Polselli home.  On May 17, and 23, 1991, Begier advised Riddell 
that Regina would be evicted from her temporary housing, unless 
Nationwide made an advance payment.  In light of Begier's 
disclosure that Regina would not rebuild her house, and in 
accordance with its policy that an insured who permanently 
relocates is entitled to less money, Nationwide advised Begier on 
May 23, that it was revising its offer to $5,000 in settlement of 
the ALE claim.  On March 31, Begier requested information 
relating to the basis of the settlement offer.  Riddell responded 
with the information almost three weeks later.  On June 24, 
without accepting the offer, Begier asked for $3,880 as an 
advance on the ALE claim pending settlement.  Nationwide agreed 
and made the payment on July 17, 1991. 
 Regina was deposed on August 28, and September 5, 1991. 
DiDonato testified that he could not accurately evaluate Regina's 
Contents claim because, at the deposition, Regina could not 
identify most of the damaged items or give additional information 
concerning their date of purchase and price.  On September 12, 
Begier notified Riddell that Regina was evicted from her 
temporary housing for non-payment of rent.  Nationwide promptly 
made arrangements, at its expense, for Regina to stay at an 
apartment complex.  Prior to these arrangements, Regina stayed at 
five different places because she did not have the funds to rent 
suitable housing.  On October 24, 1991, Nationwide issued a check 
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for $7,250 to pay for the ALE claim.  The parties eventually 
settled all claims before trial except for Regina's bad faith 
claim against Nationwide.   
 The district court found that Nationwide acted in bad 
faith in its handling of the ALE and Contents claim.  The court 
awarded Regina $75,000 and $15,000, respectively, in punitive 
damages.  Damages for bad faith were not awarded on the Building 
claim as Regina had no claim on the building.  The court found 
that Nationwide knew that Regina had an insurable interest with 
respect to the ALE claim, and that after the fire was labelled 
accidental it had absolutely no reason or justification for not 
making timely payments on the claim, especially in view of 
Regina's virtually destitute condition.  The court also found 
that, considering that it was clear that Regina was virtually 
destitute and had a substantial Contents claim, Nationwide should 
have proceeded with more dispatch in evaluating and settling the 
claim, from the date the fire was labelled accidental.   
II. 
 On appeal, Nationwide's primary contention is that the 
district court erred in determining that bad faith need only be 
proven by a preponderance of the evidence rather than by clear 
and convincing evidence.  Additionally, Nationwide asserts that 
the court erroneously defined bad faith too broadly.  Finally, it 
argues that the district court's factual findings are clearly 
erroneous. 
  Whether the trial court applied the proper 
standard is a question of law subject to plenary review.  See 
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Tudor Dev. Group v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 968 F.2d 
357, 359 (3d Cir. 1992).  Because Nationwide contends that the 
court failed to apply the proper standards with respect to the 
burden of proof for bad faith and the legal construction of the 
phrase bad faith, our review is plenary.  The district court's 
findings of fact are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. 
Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 525 
(3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 88 (1993).  Alleged 
errors in applying the law to the facts, however, are subject to 
plenary review.  Id.   
 In D'Ambrosio v. Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty 
Insurance Company, 431 A.2d 966 (Pa. 1981), The Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania held that there is no common law remedy under 
Pennsylvania law for bad faith on the part of insurers.  In 
response, the Pennsylvania legislature enacted 42 Pa.C.S.A. §8371 
which creates a statutory remedy for bad faith conduct.  The 
statute provides: 
In an action arising under an insurance 
policy, if the court finds that the insurer 
has acted in bad faith toward the insured, 
the court may take all of the following 
actions:  
 
(1) Award interest on the amount of the claim 
from the date the claim was made by the 
insured in an amount equal to the prime rate 
of interest plus 3%.  
 
(2) Award punitive damages against the 
insurer.  
 
(3) Assess court costs and attorney's fees 
against the insurer.  
 
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8371.  
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 In determining whether bad faith existed, the district 
court held, contrary to Nationwide's assertion, that the clear 
and convincing standard is not applicable.  It noted that the 
clear and convincing standard would not apply in every instance 
where punitive damages are imposed, but only in specific types of 
cases, such as defamation actions.  The district court correctly 
held that, generally, under Pennsylvania law, punitive damages 
may be imposed even without demonstrating with clear and 
convincing evidence that the claim is met.  See Martin v. Johns-
Manville Corp., 494 A.2d 1088, 1098 (Pa. 1985) (holding that 
preponderance of the evidence sufficient to support punitive 
damages claim).  In the context of bad faith, however, the court 
erred in proclaiming that a heightened standard is unnecessary.   
 In the seminal decision of Cowden v. Aetna Casualty and 
Surety Co., 134 A.2d 223, 229 (Pa. 1957), the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania pronounced that, under Pennsylvania law, bad faith 
on the part of an insurer must be proven by clear and convincing 
evidence.  See also Hall v. Brown, 526 A. 2d 413, 416 (Pa. Super. 
1987).  We too have reaffirmed this holding.  See United States 
Fire Insurance Co. v. Royal Insurance Co., 759 F.2d 306, 309 (3d 
Cir. 1985).  There being no change in Pennsylvania law, we once 
again iterate that, under Pennsylvania law, clear and convincing 
evidence is necessary to prove bad faith. 
 Although the district court did state that it "clearly" 
found Nationwide's conduct outrageous, that language is an 
insufficient indication that the court used the correct standard 
in finding bad faith, especially in light of the court's 
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rejection of Nationwide's arguments that a heightened standard of 
proof is appropriate. 
 That the bad faith claim advanced by Polselli is 
predicated on a recently enacted statutory provision does not, in 
any way, undermine our conclusion.  In enacting a statute, the 
legislature is presumed to have been familiar with the law as it 
then existed and the judicial decisions construing it.  See 
Raymond v. School Dist., 142 A.2d 749 (Pa.Super. 1958).  Had the 
legislature intended to make changes in the law with respect to 
the burden of persuasion necessary to prove bad faith, it could 
have done so expressly.  See Harka v. Nabati, 487 A.2d 432, 435 
(Pa.Super. 1985).  By failing to articulate any changes, the 
legislature implicitly acknowledged that the existing standards 
remain applicable. 
  Nationwide next asserts that the district court 
incorrectly defined bad faith.  The court stated that "Nationwide 
knew or recklessly disregarded the lack of a reasonable basis for 
denying the claims."  Nationwide contends that a reckless 
standard is insufficient to constitute bad faith.  Section 8371 
does not define the term "bad faith."  The Pennsylvania rules of 
statutory construction provide that words and phrases that "have 
acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning. . . shall be 
construed according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning. . . 
."  1 Pa. Con. Stat. Ann. § 1903 (Supp. 1992).  In the insurance 
context, the term "bad faith" has acquired a peculiar and 
universally acknowledged meaning: 
11 
Insurance.  "Bad faith" on part of insurer is 
any frivolous or unfounded refusal to pay 
proceeds of a policy; it is not necessary 
that such refusal be fraudulent.  For 
purposes of an action against an insurer for 
failure to pay a claim, such conduct imports 
a dishonest purpose and means a breach of a 
known duty (i.e., good faith and fair 
dealing), through some motive of 
self-interest or ill will;  mere negligence 
or bad judgment is not bad faith.  
   
Black's Law Dictionary 139 (6th ed. 1990) (citations omitted).    
See also Seeger by Seeger v. Allstate Ins. Co. 776 F. Supp. 986, 
989 (M.D. Pa. 1991); Coyne v. Allstate Ins. Co., 771 F. Supp. 
673, 677 (E.D.Pa. 1991).  Thus, only mere negligence on the part 
of the insurer is insufficient to constitute bad faith; 
recklessness, however, can support a finding of bad faith.   
 Contrary to Nationwide's assertion, Martin does not 
hold otherwise.  In analyzing Section 908(2) of the Restatement 
of Torts (Second) dealing with punitive damages, Martin 
distinguished between two distinct types of reckless conduct. The 
court held that punitive damages are appropriate where a 
defendant knows, or has reason to know, of facts which create a 
high degree of risk of physical harm to another, and deliberately 
proceeds to act in conscious disregard of, or indifference to 
that risk.  Martin, 494 A.2d at 1097.  However, where the 
defendant does not realize or appreciate the high degree of risk, 
even though a reasonable person would, punitive damages are 
inappropriate.  Id.  Thus, Nationwide contends that Martin stands 
for the proposition that reckless behavior cannot support a 
finding of bad faith.  Martin, however, is inapposite.   
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 First, the discussion in Martin dealing with 
recklessness was in the context of the tort of outrageous 
behavior not in the context of bad faith.  Martin does not define 
bad faith.  In any event, Martin does not hold that a finding of 
recklessness is insufficient for a court to impose punitive 
damages.  In fact, the court stated that "punitive damages are 
awarded . . .  for acts done with a bad motive or with a reckless 
indifference to the interests of others."  Id. (citation 
omitted).  Martin merely held that the recklessness had to rise 
to a more culpable level beyond gross negligence.   Id. at 1098. 
Therefore, the court in the instant case did not err in 
concluding that reckless behavior can constitute bad faith. 
However, this in no way minimizes the plaintiff's duty to prove 
bad faith by the clear and convincing standard. 
 Finally, Nationwide contends that the district court 
clearly erred in attributing virtually sole responsibility to it 
for the delayed settlement payments for Regina's ALE and Contents 
claims.  Specifically, Nationwide claims that, contrary to the 
district court's findings, it had no obligation to make partial 
or advance payments, and it had no knowledge of Regina's personal 
circumstances.  Nationwide also claims that the court erroneously 
concluded that it had no reasonable basis to contest Regina's 
claims. 
  In light of our disposition of this case, reversing 
the district court's decision for failure to apply the correct 
burden of proof, we do not reach this issue.  On remand, the 
district court should examine the evidence to ascertain whether 
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it is so "clear, direct, weighty and convincing" so as to enable 
the court to make its decision with "a clear conviction."  United  
States Fire, 759 F.2d at 309 (quoting In re Estate of Fickert, 
337 A.2d 592, 594 (Pa. 1975)).  Without expressing an opinion as 
to the result the district court should reach, we emphasize that 
in making its determination the court should consider the unique 
circumstances of this case.  Specifically, the court should 
consider whether the early filing of the bad faith suit against 
Nationwide, even before it completed it investigation, and the 
cancellation of Regina Polselli's deposition by her attorney, 
which would have aided Nationwide in computing the amount of the 
claims, contributed to an atmosphere unconducive to settlement.  
The court may want to consider whether once suit had been filed, 
did it have a deterrent effect on the negotiations between the 
adjusters or counsel for the parties.  Moreover, although it was 
not unusual for Nationwide to make advances on pending insurance 
claims, the court should ascertain whether failure to make an 
advance in this case is evidence of bad faith, when the insurance 
agreement did not require it.   
 On the other hand, the court should consider whether 
Nationwide's delay in responding to communications from Polselli, 
its poor response time in engaging an investigator and in 
conducting the investigation and its handling of the settlement 
negotiations suggest that Nationwide did not "accord the interest 
of its insured the same faithful consideration it gives its own 
interest."  Cowden, 134 A.2d at 228.  On remand, the court should 
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ascertain whether any of these factors militate for or against a 
finding that Nationwide acted in bad faith. 
 Accordingly, we hold that the district court erred 
insofar as it held that under Pennsylvania law a preponderance of 
the evidence standard is sufficient to prove bad faith on the 
part of an insurer.  The judgment of the district court will be 
reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
